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Arguments for and against Legislative
Attacks on Downstream Vertical
Integration in the Oil Industry
INTRODUCTION
The American oil industry has long been in the center of a
heated debate. Some argue that the size and economic scope of the
modern international oil company give rise to a greater possibility
of industry concentration and control, which can only be kept in
check by proactive government measures.' Others argue that the
relative size of even the largest international oil company to the
market as a whole reveals no sign of significant market concentra-
tion.2 Still others urge that recent occurrences reveal an already
existing market structure that allows the consumer and small busi-
nessman to get "raped and pillaged at the discretion of the majornI
[oil companies]." 3 Although this debate appears to lose some mo-
mentum during periods of price stability at the gasoline pump, the
sudden oil price spike4 that occurred amid the Persian Gulf conflict
has again fueled an uproar between competing constituents of the
oil industry.5
This Note examines the arguments made for and against in-
creased regulation of the activities of vertically integrated oil com-
panies in the operation of retail, or downstream, facilities. Part I
provides a brief overview of the events giving rise to the current
I See infra part IV.A.
2 See infra part IV.B.
, J. Richard Shaner, Divorcement Pressures Growing Once Again; Separation of
Petroleum Suppliers and Individual Outlets, NAT'L PETROLEUM NEws, June 1991, at 10
(quoting an unidentified Circle K executive).
4 See Gulf War Fear Hikes Oil Price By $3 A Barrel, L.A. Tms, Oct. 25, 1990, at
A3.
5 These constituents are the independent wholesale marketers of refined oil products
(often referred to as "jobbers") and the integrated oil companies that participate in
numerous markets relating to crude oil. The relevant markets include the crude production
(supply) market, the transportation market, the refining market, and the wholesale and
retail refined products market. For an examination of the positions taken by each constit-
uent, see infra part IV.
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battle centered on the vertical structure6 of the oil industry. Part
II discusses the goals of regulatory approaches, such as state di-
vorcement legislation and the proposed federal legislative response. 7
Although the proposed federal legislation is not divorcement per
se, this Note reveals that the ultimate impact of such legislation is
similar to divorcement because it permits nonintegrated retailers
and wholesalers to price the refiner out of the retail market while
simultaneously increasing the price of gasoline at the retail pump.
Part III focuses on state and federal court treatment of state
divorcement legislation. Part IV presents arguments for and against
increased government regulation. The Note concludes that divorce-
ment, as well as the proposed federal legislative response, instead
of targeting its advocates' purported goals, is anticompetitive in
nature and represents an attempt by market middlemen ("jobbers")
to increase their profits. It is an attempt that should be thwarted.
I. DIVORCEMENT'S PLATFORM: THE PREVENTION OF MARKET
CONCENTRATION
The single greatest step taken by the federal government to
attack the industrial organization of the oil industry was its pursuit
of the Standard Oil Company under the Sherman Act, culminating
in the landmark antitrust decision handed down by the United
States Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.' Al-
though this decision is the point to begin analysis of governmental
efforts to change the horizontal and vertical structure of the oil
industry, it also served as a climax for a twenty-one year period
of growing concern over the monopolization of the oil, sugar, and
whisky industries.9 Such concern was heightened by the frustrated
6 A vertically integrated company has a presence in various links of the chain
necessary to bring goods to market. For example, a fully integrated oil company would be
engaged in oil exploration and production, transportation of both crude oil and petroleum
products, refining crude oil, and marketing refined products. Horizontal integration, on the
other hand, involves increasing degrees of market concentration within a market segment.
See JOSEPH L. MAssiE, BLAZER AND AsHLAND O. 11 (1960).
7 The purpose of divorcement laws is to force oil refiners to divest their companies
of owned or operated retail service stations. Specifically, divorcement can be defined as
"prohibiting major oil [refining] companies from directly operating retail gasoline service
stations." Higher Gas Prices; Two Recent Government Reports Link Restrictive Gas Station
Ownership Laws To Higher Consumer Prices, Bus. WmE, January 19, 1989.
8 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
See BRUCE BRINGHURST, ANTITRUST D THE OIL MONOPOLY 2 (1979) (The author
notes that in "1887, fourteen corporations merged to form the sugar trust, which was
capitalized at $50 million and controlled 70 percent of American sugar-refining capacity.
[Additionally], eighty-one companies [merged to form] a whisky trust that manufactured at
least 85 percent of the nation's alcohol .... ).
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attempts of state agencies to break up the formidable Standard Oil
trust. '
On paper, the Standard Oil decision appeared to be a decisive
blow against the "evil consequences"'" of monopoly. In reality,
however, given the nature of the dissolution ordered by the Court,
12
the true victor may have been the oil industry, which even after
the decision was operated "the same old way, by the same old
men, with profits even greater than formerly."' 3 Although the
actual effectiveness of the Standard Oil decision is not within the
scope of this Note, the importance of this attempt by the federal
government to force a restructuring of the oil industry through
legislative channels cannot be overstated. It was from this precedent
that future efforts to remold the vertical structure of the oil in-
dustry through proposed divorcement legislation would emerge.'
4
As has typically been the case, the sudden resurgence of at-
tempts to restructure the oil industry through legislative initiatives
designed to curtail the role of major oil companies within the retail
marketing of gasoline is a result of a sudden crisis within the crude
markets. 5 Contemporary proponents of retail divorcement legisla-
tion point to the emergence of perversions in the pricing policies
of major refiners during the Persian Gulf conflict as an example
of this trend.'6 The "perversion" that occurred in the wake of this
10 Several attempts by state agencies failed to result in any significant effect on
Standard Oil's corporate structure or market concentration. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v.
Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413 (1910); State ex rel. Wachenheimer v. Standard Oil Co., 15 Ohio
C.C. (n.s.) 212 (1907); Standard Oil Co. v. State, 100 S.W. 705 (Tenn. 1907).
" Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57 (1911).
22 See BRIN1uHST, supra note 9, at 193-94. Several reports presented to James
McReynolds, Woodrow Wilson's Attorney General, stated that the dissolution was of
minimal impact because "the same stockholders owned all the Standard Oil companies."
Id. at 194. The dissolution decree ordered by the Court essentially required that the original
company's stock be broken up into new blocks of stock that would represent each of the
new firms carved out of Standard Oil. Reaction to this, including the reaction from Standard
Oil, was generally positive. Standard's positive and cooperative reaction to the decree may
have been due to the "startling weakness of the dissolution decree ... [as] a handful of
individuals still would hold a majority interest in all the newly independent companies."
1d. at 180.
13 Lrr aRY DiG., June 15, 1912, at 1240 (containing comments collected from the
New York Herald).
4 Divorcement legislation was first introduced during the 1930s and interest in such
legislation generally increased during disruptions in the crude markets. See Shaner, supra
note 3, at 10. For additional information on divorcement, see infra part II.
11 See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
16 See 137 CONG. REc. S13,194 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kasten).
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crisis is known as a wholesale price inversion, 17 a rare market
anomaly that typically occurs after a precipitous rise in crude oil
prices. During a price inversion, the typical pricing relationship
between spot market, wholesaler or dealer tankwagon (DTW), and
retail market becomes distorted. This results in a situation where
the price jobbers pay to oil refiners for quantities in bulk becomes
higher than the retail price available from branded retail outlets. 8
The obvious effect of this short term market anomaly is a
temporary compression that eliminates profits to the middlemen or
jobbers. In light of this very real impact, it is not surprising that
these middlemen, regardless of the wisdom of their position, now
find themselves carrying the banner of governmental regulation.' 9
The theoretic platform upon which this banner rests charges
that the current level of concentration in the oil refining industry
is dangerous to competition. The advocates of increased govern-
ment regulation predict that if concentration levels are allowed to
go unchecked, consumers will suffer in the form of higher prices
and reduced service in the long run.20 These advocates believe that
increased government involvement is necessary to ensure a com-
petitive market.21 Others, however, dispute the validity of such
arguments. For example, studies by Arizona, Maryland, and the
federal government under both the Carter and Reagan administra-
tions have found that state divorcement laws historically are harm-
ful to the consumer. n
II. DiVORCEMENT'S GOALS: THE DESTRUCTION OF TIE OIL
INDUSTRY'S VERTICAL INTEGRATION
The oil industry is a dynamic industry composed of thousands
of businesses, ranging from sole proprietorships to enormous mul-
tinational corporations.Y "It has been estimated that the oil in-
dustry contains approximately 17,000 firms."' Most of these
companies operate within one segment of the oil industry and lack
17 See The Price Inversion Intensifies Split Between Sectors of the Oil Industry, ARiz.
Bus. GAzETTE, May 24, 1991, at 1.
'" See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
19 See 137 CONG. REc. E2639-40 (daily ed. July 22, 1991) (statement of Rep. Cooper).
See 137 CONG. REc. S13,194 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1991) (statement by Sen. Kasten).
21 See id.
2 See Higher Gas Prices, supra note 7.
21 See FRED C. AiLvINE & JA ms M. PATTERSON, COMPmION, LTD.: THE MARKETIG
oF GAsoLiNE 212 (1972).
24 Id.
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significant integration into other downstream or upstream busi-
nesses. 25 Many oil companies, however, possess a certain degree of
integration ranging from the small businessman that owns a few
service stations and a fuel truck to a large multinational, such as
Mobil, that has sizable operations in all segments.26
Despite the longstanding coexistence between small and large
operators within the oil industry, critics often cite the degree of
vertical integration possessed by the larger oil companies as evi-
dence of intolerable market concentration and power. 27 According
to critic, oil expert, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Professor M. A. Adelman,
The public attitude toward the multinational oil companies brings
me back to the bad old days of Joe McCarthy .... [Flearful of
the unreachable leaders of the [U.S.S.R., Americans sought] to
find and bash an enemy at home. Today, unable to do anything
about high oil prices, many ... take it out on the multinational
oil companies. 2u
Advocates of divorcement legislation draw support from this
popular base. Although many politicians are quick to build a
platform upon such public fears, there can be no serious debate
concerning the lack of similarity between the high level of industrial
concentration within the oil industry prior to 1911 and the low
level of economic concentration that characterizes the oil industry
today.29 During Standard Oil's market predominance, it could boast
of refining, transportation, and retail market concentration levels
hovering around ninety percent.30 Today, however, the American
oil giants are capable of individually controlling only a relatively
11 See id. The oil industry is composed of four key segments. These are, ranging from
upstream to downstream, exploration and production (E&P), refining, transportation, and
marketing.
The term upstream relates to activities that occur prior to refining crude oil. An
example of an upstream activity would be crude oil production. A downstream activity is
more closely related to the marketing of refined products. One example of downstream
activity is retail gasoline marketing.
See MoBIL OI 1990 ANtuAL REPORT (1990).
See Richard B. Mancke, Competition in the Oil Industry, in VERTICAL INTEoRATION
IN THE OIL INDusTRY 35 (Edward J. Mitchell ed., 1976) (stating that critics "have been
quick to .. . charge that U.S. energy problems have been caused in large part by the
monopolistic abuses of the giant integrated oil companies").
2 Id. (quoting M. A. Adelman, statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations January 29, 1975).
" See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
" See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 33 (1911).
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small percentage of the refined products market.3 Furthermore,
concentration ratios computed for the gasoline market reveal that
the level of concentration possessed by refiners has fallen signifi-
cantly in recent years.12 Nonetheless, many so-called "consumer
advocates" and jobbers feel compelled to lobby passionately in
state and federal arenas for legislation to curb purported industry
excesses by forcing oil refiners to become divorced from their retail
gasoline operations,33 thereby eroding the degree of vertical
integration 4 in the oil industry.
Maryland's divorcement statute 5 provides a typical example of
divorcement legislation. The statute, in pertinent part, provides:
[A]fter July 1, 1974, no producer or refiner of petroleum products
shall open a major brand, secondary brand or unbranded retail
service station in the State of Maryland, and operate it with
company personnel, a subsidiary company, commissioned agent,
or under a contract with any person, firm or corporation, man-
aging a service station on a fee arrangement with the producer
or refiner. The station must be operated by a retail service station
dealer.
36
The result of this provision is clear-if a company owns a refinery,
it cannot participate directly in Maryland's retail gasoline market.
Delaware, another divorcement state, accomplished its goal of
eliminating direct participation by larger, vertically integrated oil
companies in the state's retail gasoline markets through a similar
provision.3 7 Section 2905(a) of the Delaware Code provides: "No
manufacturer of petroleum products shall open a major brand,
secondary brand or unbranded retail gasoline outlet or service
station in the State, that would be operated by company personnel,
a subsidiary company, or a commissioned agent."
38
1, For example, only five of the world's fifteen largest oil companies are American.
Exxon, the largest American oil company, ranks third in comparison with other international
oil companies. See Only Five U.S. Oil Companies Among Top 15 In The World, THE
REUTER Bus. RaP., Dec. 12, 1988.
32 J. Richard Shaner, Is "Big Oil" Getting Bigger? Well, Yes and No; But Not Really;
Growth of U.S. Oil Companies, NAT'L PETRoLEum NEws, November, 1991, at 42 (noting
that while the assets of the fifteen largest American oil companies have increased sizably
during the last twenty years, the level of concentration has declined by 16%).
33 See infra notes 98-112 and accompanying text.
34 For an outstanding collection of essays on the topic of vertical integration in the
oil industry, see VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE Om. INDusTRY, supra note 27.
5 MND. ANN. CODE art. 56 § 157E(b) (1988).
6 Id.
11 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2905 (Supp. 1990).
38 Id.
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Unlike the Maryland provision, the Delaware statute incorpo-
rates a peculiar "emergency" provision that can serve to nullify
temporarily section 2905(a).3 9 Section 2905(b) provides: "The Of-
fice of Retail Gasoline Sales shall adopt rules or regulations defin-
ing the circumstances in which a manufacturer may temporarily
operate a service station in times of emergency or similar special
circumstances." 4 This provision was used by the Court of Chan-
cery of Delaware in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Tribbitt41 to prevent
the taking of Atlantic Richfield's property right in a station in
danger of being abandoned by an independent lessee.42 The Court
stated:
As to the argument that the statutes would deprive plaintiffs of
property rights by prohibiting them from taking over the opera-
tion of a retail station in the event it should be abandoned by
the independent retailer leasing it, it seems clear that the provi-
sions of §2905(b) contemplate the adoption of administrative
regulations authorizing operation by producers and refiners on a
temporary basis "in times of emergency or similar special circum-
stances." 43
In addition to Maryland and Delaware, Connecticut, Virginia and
the District of Columbia have enacted similar statutes.
44
Ironically, although these state laws regulate the level of vertical
integration of a refiner, they make no attempt to bar integration
and market concentration between the wholesale and retail markets
by large jobbers. Jobbers clearly fall outside the scope of laws,
such as the Delaware statute, that regulate the "manufacturer of
petroleum products. ' 4 As a result, there is no obstacle restricting
jobbers from integrating downward into retail service stations while
the refiner, a major competitor, is removed from the marketplace.
Although it is not argued that further regulation divorcing jobbers
from their service stations should be implemented, such inconsis-
tency must be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of
divorcement statutes.
Little consideration has been given to the results of allowing
jobbers a greater market concentration. Yet, numerous states and
39 See id.
40 Id.
41 399 A.2d 535 (Del. Ch. 1977).
42 See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Tribbitt, 399 A.2d 535, 545 (Del. Ch. 1977).
43 Id.
" See Shaner, supra note 3, at 10.
41 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,"§ 2905(a).
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the federal government have renewed their interest in regulatory
responses which serve to accomplish similar goals. These states
include Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Utah, and Texas. 46
III. DIVORCEMENT AND THE COURTS: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO STATE DIVORCEMENT LAWS
To date, two cases have presented constitutional challenges to
state divorcement laws: Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Tribbitt47 and
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland.4
A. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Tribbitt
In Atlantic Richfield, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judg-
ment from the Court of Chancery of Delaware, arguing that De-
laware's divorcement provision49 was unconstitutional on a number
of grounds:
[The Plaintiffs] contend ... that the statutes deny them equal
protection of the law [,J ... conflict with the Commerce Clause
... [and] violate the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Consti-
tution .... 0
The plaintiffs also urged that the statute resulted in "a taking of
property without just compensation" 51 and also served to "impair
the obligation of contracts in violation of Article 1, Section 10 of
the Constitution. ' 52 The court rejected all of the arguments in
upholding the validity of the statute.53
The court rejected the Commerce Clause argument presented
by Atlantic Richfield because the Delaware act failed to affect the
movement of petroleum products through the state.54 In the words
of the court:
[Section] 2905 and § 2906 do not violate the Commerce Clause
... because they do not limit or affect the flow of gas into or
46 See Shaner, supra note 3, at 10. None of the bills proposed in these states has yet
come to a final vote.
- 399 A.2d 535 (Del. Ch. 1977).
- 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
49 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
- Atlantic Richfield, 399 A.2d at 535.
51 Id.
52 Id.
1 See id. at 549.
-" See id. at 545.
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out of the state; rather they only regulate an intrastate activ-
ity .... The effect of the legislation is not to protect Delaware
business interests to the exclusion of out-of-state interests. .... 55
The plaintiff's Supremacy Clause argument was based on the
claim that the state's power to regulate retail marketing practices
was preempted by both section 2(b) of the Clayton Act 5 6 after
amendment by the Robinson-Patman Act,5 7 and the Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973.58 The court, relying on the
Maryland high court's analysis in Governor of Maryland v. Exxon,5 9
held that the relevant text of the Robinson-Patman Act would not
allow the type of conduct prohibited by the Delaware statute. Thus,
there was "no conflict between the state and federal law [and
therefore] no violation of the Supremacy Clause." 6 In reaching
this conclusion, the Maryland court also relied on FTC v. Sun Oil
Co. ,61 which "concluded that the right to limited territorial price
discrimination ... under § 2(b) is not available ... where a
supplier reduces its price to its dealer so as to enable its dealer to
meet the price of a competing dealer." 62
With respect to Atlantic Richfield's argument that the Delaware
statute was preempted by the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
of 1973, the court simply stated that a "federal act only preempts
attempted state regulation which would be in actual conflict. '"63
The court found no actual conflict between the state and federal
statutes.64
The court also refused to accept the plaintiff's argument that
the statute amounted to a "taking of property without just com-
pensation. '65 In making this argument, the oil company relied
",Id.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988) (current codification) (criminalizing price fixing, rebate
schemes, and other monopolistic restraints on trade).
15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13c (1988) (current codification) (criminalizing price discrimina-
tion).
'I Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that this act does not reflect
an intent of Congress for the federal government to become a price regulator. See, e.g.,
Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 495 (1988).
59 370 A.2d 1102 (Md. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
- Atlantic Richfield, 399 A.2d at 546.
61 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
-Atlantic Richfield, 399 A.2d at 545-46 (construing FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S.
505 (1963)).
" Id. at 545.
64 See id.
6Id.
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heavily on its contractual right to assume the operation of aban-
doned retail stations. 66 Under the divorcement law, the company
argued, such a contractual right would be lost.67 After a close
reading of the statute, the court rejected this argument. It held
that in "special circumstances" an oil refiner would be able to
assume temporarily the operation of abandoned sights under sec-
tion 2905(b), which allows such activity "in times of emergency or
similar special circumstances.' '68
B. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland
The issues presented before the Court of Chancery of Delaware
in Atlantic Richfield set the stage for a ruling by the United States
Supreme Court the following year. The case that ultimately estab-
lished the constitutionality of state divorcement laws was Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland.
69
In response to Maryland's divorcement law, 70 numerous enti-
ties, including Exxon, Shell, Gulf Oil and Ashland Oil, brought
suit against the Governor of Maryland in separate actions, claiming
that the statute violated the Commerce Clause and the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution.7' The separate appeals
of six oil companies were consolidated and argued before the
Supreme Court.72
See id.
See id.
6 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. With respect to the plaintiffs'
Fourteenth Amendment challenge, that the state abused its police power, the court held
that the burden of proof was with Atlantic Richfield and that the "plaintiffs have [not]
carried the burden required of them to establish the unconstitutionality of the enactments."
Atlantic Richfield, 399 A.2d at 544-45.
As for the plaintiff's equal protection argument, the court found "that it can be
reasonably conceived that factual necessity exists for prohibiting retail operations ... by
refiners in order to preserve ... competition in the retail gasoline market." The Court
found the divorcement statute to be an "approach [with a] ... reasonable relationship to
the prevention of the anticipated evil."
The problem with this analysis is that the law fails to make any attempt to curtail
market concentration by jobbers after the enactment of the divorcement legislation. This
calls into question the reasonableness of the statute in "preserv[ing] competition in the retail
gasoline market." Id.
437 U.S. 117 (1978).
70 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
71 See Exxon, 437 U.S. 117.
7 See id. at 122. Exxon instituted an action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County and listed all other similar actions that were filed. The cases were then consolidated
for trial. See Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 370 A.2d 1102, 1106-7 (Md. 1977),
aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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The appellants argued that the act violated the Commerce
Clause: "(1) by discriminating against interstate commerce; (2) by
unduly burdening interstate commerce; and (3) by imposing con-
trols on a commercial activity of such an essentially interstate
character that it is not amenable to state regulation." 7 3 The Court
rejected this argument in its entirety and concluded that states are
not "without power to regulate in this area. ' 74 The Court relied
heavily on the fact that the Act did not affect "interstate marketers
... that own and operate their own retail gasoline stations." 75 The
-decision also noted that the Act would have no effect on interstate
dealers that wished to participate in the state's retail gasoline
market as long as "[the participant] do[es] not refine or produce
gasoline." ' 76 In the words of the Court, "The fact that the burden
of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not,
by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate com-
merce."
77
The Court also refused to find an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce. Exxon based this allegation on the trial court's
finding that as a result of the law, several refiners were exiting the
Maryland products market entirely. 7 In rejecting this argument,
the Court stated that although "[s]ome refiners may choose to
withdraw entirely from the Maryland market[,] ... there is no
reason to assume that their share ... will not be promptly replaced
by other interstate refiners." '7 9 Finally, the Court rejected Exxon's
argument that the cumulative effect of numerous state divorcement
laws would affect national gasoline marketing efforts and therefore
violate the Commerce Clause. 0 The Court found no support for
the contention that the Commerce Clause "pre-empts the field of
retail gas[oline] marketing." 81
" Exxon, 437 U.S. at 125.
74 Id. at 128-29.
" Id. at 125-26.
76 Id. at 126.
" Id. (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted in footnote 16
that the situation at issue in the case was distinguishable from the Court's decision in Hunt
v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977). In Hunt, a state
statute enacted to increase the market share of goods produced within the state was found
to violate the Commerce Clause. In Exxon, however, the Court found that because Maryland
had no refining capacity of its own, the proportion of gasoline shipped in from out of state
would remain the same. See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126.
1 Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127.
79 Id.
a, See id. at 128.
91 Id.
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Further, the Court flatly rejected the substantive due process
argument presented in Exxon,8 2 relying on the lower court's deter-
mination that Exxon's evidence concerning the irrationality of the
act in light of the evidence that the presence of refiners in the
retail market enhanced competition was merely an "evaluation of
the economic wisdom of the statute. ' 8 3 Citing its 1963 opinion in
Ferguson v. Skrupa,8 4 the Court stated that the Due Process Clause
does not allow the Court "to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the
wisdom of legislation. '85
Although seven justices joined in the majority opinion, Justice,
Blackmun filed a well reasoned opinion in which he concurred in
part and dissented in part.8 6 Relying on numerous cases, including
Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission,87 Halliburton
Oil Well Co. v. Reily,88 Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 9 and Best &
Co. v. Maxwell,9° Blackmun stated: "The Commerce Clause for-
bids discrimination against interstate commerce, which repeatedly
has been held to mean that [s]tates ... may not discriminate
against the transactions of out-of-state actors in interstate mar-
kets." 91
Focusing on the application of the Hunt decision to Maryland's
divorcement statute, Blackmun noted: "If discrimination results
from a statute, the burden falls upon the state or local government
to demonstrate legitimate local benefits justifying the inequality
and to show that less discriminatory alternatives cannot protect the
local interests.''92 Blackmun's concern is supported by the partic-
ular circumstances surrounding the Exxon case. First, although
Maryland cited its interest in protecting its citizens from the harm-
ful effects of purported "preferential treatment" during supply
shortages, 93 its argument was weakened by the fact that only 36 of
the 3,80094 retail service stations in Maryland were operated by
82 See id. at 124-25.
83 Id. at 124.
372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
Exxon, 437 U.S. at 124.
16 See id. at 134 (Powell, J., took no part in the consideration of these cases).
- 432 U.S. 333, 350-52 (1977).
- 373 U.S. 64, 69-73 (1963).
340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
-' 311 U.S. 454, 455-56 (1940).
91 Exxon, 437 U.S. at 136.
92 Id.
91 See id. at 121.
See id. at 123.
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Exxon, and these few were designed primarily to "test innovative
marketing concepts or products." 95 Furthermore, only five percent
of retail service stations in Maryland were operated by refiners or
affiliates when the statute was enacted. 96 Because of the tenuous
connection between the intent of the statute and its actual effect
on interstate commerce, Justice Blackmun, following Dean Milk,
stated: "This Court does not ... accept without analysis purported
local interests. Instead, it independently identifies the character of
the interests and judges for itself whether alternatives will be ade-
quate."9,
7
The Exxon court cleared a path for further enactment of state
divorcement laws by holding that such laws are constitutional.
Nonetheless, the wisdom of such state legislative efforts -is the
subject of great debate.
IV. CONFICTING VIEWPOINTS ON DIVORCEMENT LEGISLATION
A. Arguments in Favor of Divorcement Legislation
Advocates of forced divestment typically address two potential
effects of continued participation by refiners in the retail gasoline
market. First, according to such advocates, allowing refiners to
continue direct participation in the retail gasoline market will cost
consumers through higher prices. This higher cost will be facilitated
by the increased market concentration and control over the retail
gasoline market refiners will be able to amass over time. 9 Second,
divorcement advocates see the need to protect independent retailers
from the "anticompetitive spirit ... of the big oil companies."99
In support of these two arguments, divorcement advocates cite
the appearance of pricing anomalies, which characterize a wholesale
price inversion, as indicating the desire of refiners to force jobbers
out of business. 100 These advocates argue that the refiners seek to
drive jobbers out of business in order to allow themselves to create
I' d. at 121 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 123.
17 Id. at 137.
" 137 CONG. REc. S13,194 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (testimony of Mr. Springer).
Mr. Springer's statements were made in support of H.R. 2966, which is not a divorcement
bill, but a bill designed to ensure favorable pricing for jobbers. See infra notes 129-36 and
accompanying text. But see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
137 CONG. REc. S13,194 (testimony of Mr. Springer).
lo See id.
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a "retail gasoline market monopol[y]."'' 1 Furthermore, it is hy-
pothesized that the ultimate effects of uncontrolled retail marketing
efforts on the part of refiners will include greater distances between
service stations, and poorer overall service, especially in rural ar-
eas.' 02
Jobbers produce evidence of unfavorable pricing scenarios to
support their position that refiners use anticompetitive tactics to
force wholesalers out of business.0 3 For example, William Springer,
treasurer-secretary of Lakeshore Oil and Tire Co. testified before
the Senate Small Business Committee that on August 21, 1990,
while Marathon was charging $1.219 per gallon to consumers at
its branded company operated outlets, his company was being
charged $1.2855 per gallon when it purchased gasoline in quantities
as large as 8,000 gallons. °4 The jobbers argue that refiners like
Marathon are capable of engaging in such tactics because of their
integration into market segments such as crude production. This
contention is based on the theory that the retail operations of the
refiner are "subsidized" by profits realized in the refiner's other
operating segments. 0 5
To further their arguments, jobbers focus on recent sales de-
clines among wholesalers and independent retailers, citing a four-
teen percent decline in sales by jobbers over the last four years
while pointing to a corresponding increase in sales at refiner-
operated service stations.'06 Similar statistics display tremendous
increases in the profits of refiners during the first quarter of 1991,
which contrast with sizable declines in profits on the part of
jobbers. 0 7
In light of the recent flurry of legislative interest in divorcement
laws and other measures to control the activities of refiners in retail
markets, it is clear that the arguments supporting divorcement are
not being made in vain. The positive reaction to these positions
has not been limited to the states.'0 Recently, bills have been
10l Id.
102 See id. (statement of Sen. Kasten).
103 See id. (testimony of Mr. Springer).
104 See id.
105 See id.
106 See 137 CONG. RiEc. E2639-40 (daily ed. July 22, 1991) (statement of Rep. Cooper).
117 See id. at 2640.
" For a discussion of state enactments, see supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
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introduced in both the Senate09 and the House ' 10 to address the
issue.
The congressional bills approach the perceived problem from a
different angle. For example, in the House version,"' styled "The
Petroleum Marketing Competition Enhancement Act," refiners are
not banned from the retail market as they are in state divorcement
statutes. Instead, they are subject to a pricing hierarchy under
which they are mandated to charge a price no lower than a certain
amount. Although these are not divorcement bills per se, the effect
of the legislation would give jobbers the ability to price refiners
out of the retail market.1
2
B. Arguments against Divorcement Legislation
The adverse effects of divorcement legislation on the consumer
are often cited by oil refiners, policy analysts, and economists
when arguing against such measures. Such criticism is further ele-
vated by the fact that the primary goals of divorcement statutes,
the preservation of competition"' and the prevention of consoli-
dation within the retail gasoline markets, n1 4 are being met naturally
within the market. These market advocates point to the reality of
modern retail gasoline marketing, which reveals that concentration
ratios today are substantially below levels of the 1950s.1- In ad-
dition, although the Supreme Court upheld Maryland's divorce-
ment law in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,1' 6 it recognized
the potential harm to consumers caused by the statute, noting that
"[i]t may be true that the consuming public will be injured by the
loss of the high-volume, low-priced stations operated by the inde-
pendent refiners.' 1'7
Another significant criticism of the advocates of divorcement
statutes is that the timing of the attacks upon the oil industry seems
'10 See 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 554 (1991) (bill introduced by Sen.
Deconcini).
110 See 137 CONG. REc. at E2631 (bill introduced by Rep. Synar).
' H.R. 2966, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
112 See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
"I See Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 370 A.2d 1102, 1111 (1977), aff'd, 437
U.S. 117 (1978).
"' See 137 CONG. Rac. S13,194 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991).
", See Dougher & Hofmann, Market Shares and Individual Company Data for U.S.
Energy Markets: 1950-1989, in AmERicAN PETROLEum INsTuTE DISCUSSION PAPER #014R,
Oct. 1990, at 93.
116 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
"I Id. at 128.
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to suggest the presence of ulterior motives. In the words of econ-
omist Charles Doran, "We were especially conscious that the se-
lection of the oil industry as target, the post-energy crisis timing,
and the industrywide focus of divestiture suggest that this ... is
not an ordinary antitrust endeavor."'' Doran points to other fac-
tors suggesting that considerations other than "monopoly busting"
are foremost in the minds of divorcement advocates. For example,
Doran indicates that if reduction of market concentration were the
true aim of divorcement advocates, it would appear to be more
logical to attack far more concentrated industries like the steel,
computer, aluminum and automotive industries.119 Furthermore,
Doran argues that despite the pro-divorcement rally of the mid-
70s, which sparked a debate in Congress, the "Senate hearings...
produced no evidence of wrongdoing by the oil companies during
the 1973 oil crisis ... [and no evidence] turned up ... that the
oil companies had created the crisis or the subsequent oil short-
age."' m Finally, Doran claims that the public perception that oil
company profits are "at an all-time high"121 supports the attack
on major oil companies. To this, he responds that "[the belief]
that current profitability is at an all-time high is but a myth."
1 "
Another attack against advocates of divorcement statutes is
aimed at misconceptions surrounding the cause of wholesale price
inversions. While regulation advocates argue that such inversion is
caused by intentional activities on the part of oil refiners and that
inversion itself is "[cilearly ... indic[ative of] an anticompetitive
spirit on the part of the big oil companies,' ' 3 free market econ-
omists cite a market force at work.
A recent work by Professor Philip E. Sorensen presents the
latter position.124 As the title, An Economic Analysis of the Dis-
tributor-Dealer Wholesale Gasoline Price Inversion of 1990: The
Effects of Different Contractual Relations, suggests, Sorensen links
the cause of the wholesale price inversion not to "Ghosts, Goblins,
and Other Mysterious Creatures" 125 masquerading as oil executives,
"I CH.Ls F. DORAN, MYTH, Om, AND PoLrrcs 98 (1977).
119 See id. at 71.
120 Id. at 50.
121 Id. at 69.
In2 Id.
2 137 CONG. Rc. S13,194 (testimony of Mr. Springer).
,2, See PHIUP E. SORENSEN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRIBuToR-DEAI R
WHOLESALE GASOLINE PRICE INVERSION OF 1990: TaE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS (1991).
125 DoRAN, supra note 118, at 5.
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but to "the differing degrees of contractual price protection pro-
vided to buyers in ... separate competitive markets."12 6
As stated previously, during a wholesale price inversion the
typical pricing hierarchy becomes inverted, resulting in retail prices
at the pump being lower than jobber costs (DTW) and the spot
market. Sorensen argues that the price inversion, which occurs
during periods of rapidly escalating prices, stems from the natural
inverse relationship between the strength of the contractual rela-
tionship and the lack of price protection. For example, lessee-
dealers of a refinery typically have the strongest contractual ties to
refiners so it is logical that this group is the beneficiary of the
greatest level of price protection. On the other hand, the spot
market, which by definition involves a one time agreement to
purchase or sell, carries no contractual obligation beyond the exe-
cution of the exchange. Clearly, in this relationship, no price
protection can exist from one transaction to another. Between these
two extremes lie the jobbers, who typically maintain a weak con-
tractual relationship with several refiners.12 7 According to Sorensen,
these differing relationships result in the price inversion as crude
stpply price spikes reveal themselves more slowly to the refiner's
dealers, who enjoy strong contractual ties with their supplier. With
less price protection afforded jobbers, prices increase more rapidly,
sometimes surpassing retail prices. Finally, the greatest volatility
naturally occurs in the spot market where there is, by definition,
no contractual price protection.'2
CONCLUSION
Although the arguments for government intervention on behalf
of jobbers and consumers may have surface appeal, an overview
of the arguments both for and against divorcement and other
similar legislative tools leads to the conclusion that the debate is
fueled more by the desire of market middlemen to ensure profit
margins than by a desire to fight market concentration. This is
particularly true of recent federal bills that serve primarily to
guaranty jobbers a fixed minimum profit range. 2 9
'26 SORENSEN, supra note 124, at 6.
127 See SORENSEN, supra note 124, at 3-6.
'2 See id. at 4-5.
-2 Both the House and Senate versions could serve to force refiners out of the retail
gasoline market by requiring a minimum markup by refiners selling gasoline through refiner
controlled retail service stations. In both bills, this minimum markup is based on the
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This guarantied profit floor is proposed in H.R. 2966, in its
amendment to the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act.3 0 The text
of the proposed bill provides:
It shall be unlawful for a refiner to sell motor fuel, to any
customer for resale, at a price which is higher than the refiner's
adjusted retail price for the same or similar grade or quality of
motor fuel sold from a direct operated outlet in the same geo-
graphic area.'
On its surface, this provision appears to do nothing more than
give the jobber a statutory right to purchase gasoline at least as
cheaply as the consumer. However, this is not the case. Deep in
the bill's enforcement provision is a section establishing a prima
facie case for violation of section 401(a).13 2 Section 403(d)(1)(A)
allows for the establishment of a prima facie case when the jobber
is charged more than "94 percent of [the refiner's] consumer retail
price per gallon.' 3 3 Furthermore, section 403(d)(1)(B) lowers this
percentage to 90 percent if a "branded wholesaler" is involved.
3 4
Clearly, this bill seeks to provide jobbers with a tremendous
competitive advantage, especially because a jobber typically "owns
many of the stations he supplies.' ' 3 Under this regulatory scheme,
there exists the potential for extensive market perversion.
36
It is hoped that bills such as this will face an early demise.
Typically, pointing fingers at large oil companies is a politically
advantageous tactic. But, perhaps because this battle is being fought
between separate segments within the oil industry, some elements
of society have approached this "legislative solution" more cau-
tiously. For example, after talks were initiated concerning the
prevailing rack price of each grade of gasoline. Even supporters of these bills acknowledge
the great potential "that the margins [they] would establish might in effect become minimum
markups, which would not be in the best interest of consumers." 137 CoNo. REc. E2639,
E2640 (daily ed. July 22, 1991) (statement of Rep. Cooper).
1- 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (1988).
1 H.R. 2966, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 401(a) (1991).
132 See id. at § 403(d).
1 Id.
134 See id.
... SORENSEN, supra note 124, at 3-4.
13 For example, assume refiner A is selling gasoline retail for $1.00 per gallon. This
would establish, under § 403(d)(1)(A), a maximum unbranded wholesale price of $.94 per
gallon. In this scenario, there is nothing to prevent the jobber from selling gasoline through
his own stations at $.99 per gallon, undercutting the refiner's stations when the refiner is
by law punished if he lowers his prices in an effort to compete. This scenario is highly
likely to evolve if a bill such as H.R. 2966 becomes law.
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introduction of such bills, North Carolina voters were informed by
the press that elected officials were introducing legislation that
would cost North Carolina constituents alone $92 million per year.
137
Other studies by the federal government also have indicated that
divorcement ultimately leads to higher consumer cost.
138
The evidence supports the determination that state divorcement
laws and similar federal proposals primarily serve the product
middleman at a great expense to the consumer. There is no evidence
of a pronounced trend or a concerted effort on the part of oil
refiners to use pricing tactics to force jobbers out of business. The
call for divorcement is merely a call for subsidizing a product
middleman's profits, and it is a call that, for the sake of efficiency
and the consumer, should not be accepted.
Jeffrey L. Spears
'" See Thornburg Gasoline Plan Will Cost Tarheel Motorists $92 Million More Each
Year in Higher Prices, PR Nawswnm, Sept. 7, 1990.
M See Higher Gas Prices; Two Recent Government Reports Link Restrictive Gas
Station Ownership Laws To Higher Consumer Prices, Bus. WImE, January 19, 1989.
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